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AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT
Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. The Science of Military Strategy. Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 2005. 504pp. $40

This first English-language volume on
strategy by China’s People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was translated by a team of
experts at the Academy of Military Sciences from the original Chinese-language
version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by
two major generals with significant
ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers
to China’s powerful Central Military
Commission (CMC) and Politburo
Standing Committee, this volume undoubtedly reflects elements of critical
policy trends in Beijing and hence merits close examination by foreign researchers and policy makers. Since this
book has deliberately been made accessible to an overseas audience, it is important to reflect on what message its
English-language publication may be
intended to convey.
The 2001 Chinese-language version is
used to educate senior PLA decision
makers, including those on the CMC, as
well as officers who may become China’s
future strategic planners. Now in its
fourth printing, it can be read along
with a variety of other texts, such as the
more operationally and tactically focused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue),
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published by China’s National Defense
University in 2000, the better to understand actual PLA doctrine. The closest
U.S. equivalent to these volumes collectively might be Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0).
Part One surveys China’s historical experience and development of military
theory. The authors describe the current age as an “era of sea,” in which
maritime states, like their predecessors,
will employ Mahanian and other strategies to “actively develop comprehensive
sea power” and “expand strategic depth
at sea.” Part Two offers Chinese perspectives on the laws and conduct of
war. Chapter 9, on “Strategic Deterrence,” deserves particular attention, as
it clearly provides a rationale for many
elements of the PLA’s modernization
program that have been overlooked by
many foreign analysts. Part Three examines future warfare and the implications for China, including recent PLA
experience and combat guidelines.
Throughout the volume, the continuing
relevance of the People’s War is emphasized as a foundation of Chinese military strategy.
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It is this third section that will be of
greatest interest to Western scholars
seeking insights into PLA thinking
about China’s strategic situation. The
authors of this volume believe that
China, both a land and a sea power,
faces multifaceted strategic opportunities and challenges. Despite its eighteenthousand-kilometer coastline, China is
currently constrained by the world’s
longest island chain, centering on strategically, politically, and economically
vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from
China’s only disputed territory, however: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of
maritime territory, “one ninth of
China’s national land territory,” remains under contention. The authors
also identify energy supply security as
critical to China’s national development. Their statement that the South
China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves
equivalent to that of [the] Middle East”
conflicts with Western assessments,
however, leaving the reader wondering
about the true strategic underpinnings
of Beijing’s claims.
The authors foresee possible threats to
China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights,
and great cause of reunification,”
threats that, should all other measures
fail, may necessitate a defensive (and
therefore inherently just) war on
China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air
spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local
wars” may well require the PLA to confront a technologically superior adversary. Accordingly, the authors suggest
emphasizing preemption; employment
of a broad spectrum of military technologies, including asymmetric “trump
card” weapons; and integration of civilian and military forces in missions (e.g.,
“guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that incorporate political, economic, and legal
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warfare. While this volume raises as
many questions as it answers, it is nevertheless a welcome contribution to a vital field in which so little authoritative
information is available.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Howarth, Peter. China’s Rising Sea Power: The
PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge. New York:
Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. $125

Peter Howarth, an Australian former
diplomat and intelligence analyst, presents an excellent mix of strategic theory, political dynamics, and tactical
detail in considering the Chinese submarine fleet. His treatment demonstrates a keen understanding of both
parts of the phrase “politico-military
strategy,” and it is the type of thinking
that Jeffrey Record of the Air War College recently opined is too often missing in the American community.
Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if
only because one gets to visit so many
old friends in strategic theory, such as
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett,
Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie,
Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René
Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and
Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tsetung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu.
Like so many others who write about
China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin
Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sensational claims on the subject, presumably thereby justifying the work and
attracting attention. However, what distinguishes Howarth from so many others who have searched and found
reasons to be alarmed at the conventional naval power of China is that he
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tempers the sensational with frank assessments of China’s limitations.
At the heart of this examination of Chinese submarines, practically speaking, is
the potential showdown over Taiwan.
While Howarth notes that “China, like
Germany, is handicapped by geography,” he points out that the defense of
Taiwan is equally handicapped by
oceanography: its narrow and crowded
seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His
frankness, however, about such U.S.
problems as naval drawdown, global responsibility, vulnerability of surface
ships to missile saturation, and the difficulties of operations in narrow seas
gives one new pause.
As an example of what is best about his
work, Howarth considers not only the
tactical problems for China, Taiwan,
and the United States (including the
exact requirements for successful submarine warfare against a carrier-based
navy) but also the proper political context of that potential conflict—that a
politically free and economically prosperous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at
the heart of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to
the intersection of tactics and strategic
judgment, Howarth includes in his final
chapter an economical summary of the
logic by which Chinese decision makers
might be optimistic enough about their
chances for success to initiate a conflict
with Taiwan.
One weakness in this confluence of politics, strategy, and tactical matchups is
that Howarth exaggerates the strategic
influence of the great thinkers on policy.
His demonstration of how submarine
warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches,
suggesting as it does that submarine
warfare fits perfectly with preformed
Chinese strategic preferences. The logic
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of a preemptive surprise attack is part
of the Chinese strategic culture, he says,
but one does not have to cite the number of wars per year in which the Ming
dynasty engaged, for example, in order
to support the conclusion that “the
Pentagon has some justification in considering that the risk of Beijing resorting to force to try to resolve the Taiwan
issue is growing with the modernization
and transformation of the PRC’s military capabilities.”
Howarth is better off with his more elegant logic that submarines are designed
for the task of concealment and surprise and that surprise is a good tactic
when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern
and Western war planners have both
made use of the submarine and have
appreciated it for the qualities for which
it is designed, regardless of whether
they were Chinese or their ancient ancestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.
Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to
blend classic strategic thinking with
current politics and tactical complexities that is informative, intelligent, and
provocative in this book. It is recommended for any library on naval affairs
or Asian conflict, and good reading for
both U.S. and Chinese war planners.
PETER J. WOOLLEY

Fairleigh Dickinson University

Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and
Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp.
$125

Given the importance of the Taiwan issue for U.S. foreign and security policy
in East Asia, it is striking that relatively
little has been written on Taiwan’s defense reform and modernization
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programs, especially in contrast to the
substantial amount of work scholars
and policy analysts have produced in
recent years on Chinese military modernization and its implications for regional security. Bernard Cole’s Taiwan’s
Security: History and Prospects, which
provides a comprehensive and well
written assessment of recent developments in Taiwan’s defense establishment, represents an important step in
filling this gap.
In this work, Cole—a respected China
scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for
thirty years and is now professor of international history at the National War
College—examines the changes currently under way in Taiwan’s armed
forces and defense bureaucracy. The
main purpose of Cole’s thorough and
well researched study is to assess
changes in Taiwan’s defense posture
and their implications for the island’s
security. After presenting a brief history
of Taiwan’s military and an overview of
the Chinese military threat, Cole explains that Taiwan in recent years has
been unwilling to increase the level of
resources devoted to its own military
capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorganizing its defense bureaucracy and its
military is professional and well trained,
the growing asymmetry in defense
spending between Taiwan and China is
resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s
long-standing qualitative edge over the
Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues
quite persuasively that the cross-strait
military balance is tipping toward
China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively
modest response to the growing security
challenge represented by the acceleration of Chinese military modernization.
Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend
itself on its own and may not even be
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able to hold out until the U.S. military
could intervene decisively.
Cole also includes a brief discussion of
the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwillingness to do more to counter China’s
growing military capability. He argues,
first, that many officials in Taiwan believe Chinese military threats lack credibility and, second, that decision
makers in Taipei are convinced that the
United States would come to Taiwan’s
assistance even if they turn out to have
underestimated China’s willingness to
use force. According to Cole, the U.S.
decision to send two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the region during the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only
convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan
would likely result in American military
intervention but also led Taipei to the
same conclusion. Given the assumptions that China lacks the willingness to
use force and that U.S. intervention is
virtually assured in the unlikely event of
a cross-strait conflict, many politicians
in Taiwan conclude that the island does
not really need to invest its own scarce
resources in defense. In all, Taiwan’s
Security makes an important contribution to scholarship and policy analysis
by providing a readable and informative
assessment of a previously understudied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan
relationship.
MICHAEL S. CHASE

Naval War College

Asada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The
Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
385pp. $36.95
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Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of
China commonly compare this emerging
Asian titan to imperial Germany, whose
unification upset the European greatpower concert ushered in after Waterloo,
and for good reason. Naval enthusiasts
like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, their imaginations
fired by the works of Alfred Thayer
Mahan, hurled Germany into naval
competition with Great Britain, the
dominant naval power of the day, with
fateful results. References to Mahan are
now routine among Chinese strategic
thinkers. Will China’s Mahanians prod
Beijing onto a similar path to sea
power, and will similar results ensue?
Along comes Sadao Asada, an emeritus
professor at Japan’s Doshisha University. Asada’s masterful book From
Mahan to Pearl Harbor reminds us that
Asian maritime history also offers compelling lessons on how the rise of a new
sea power, in this case imperial Japan,
can disturb a settled nautical equilibrium. In effect, the book is an intellectual history of the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN). As the title suggests, the
book traces the influence of Mahanian
theory on Japanese naval thinkers in the
decades after The Influence of Sea Power
upon History appeared in 1890.
Asada attributes the IJN’s use and misuse of Mahan to a combination of factors—bureaucratic rivalry between the
army and the navy, groupthink within
the naval hierarchy, and an abdication
of leadership by senior officials, to
name three. By the onset of World War
II, the navy had convinced itself that
war with the United States was fated
and that Japan could overcome America’s overwhelming material superiority
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by cultivating a warrior ethos in the
ranks. Perversely, IJN leaders disregarded key aspects of Mahanian theory,
in particular the material foundations
of sea power, as they contemplated
Mahanian naval warfare in the Pacific.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes an
ideal companion to David C. Evans and
Mark R. Peattie’s Kaigun, which reviews
the strategies, tactics, and technologies
deployed by the IJN between the service’s inception in Meiji Japan and the
outbreak of World War II. Jon Tetsuro
Sumida’s Inventing Grand Strategy and
Teaching Command, a spirited defense of
Mahan against his detractors, would
make a useful supplement and counterpoint to Asada’s analysis.
Asada’s account is not impervious to
criticism. First, linking deeds with
words and words with thoughts is no
simple matter for historians. His many
references to Japanese officers, say,
“echoing” Mahan or acting out of
“Mahanian navalism” invite critics to
quibble. The author establishes that
many Japanese mariners were reared on
Mahan, but how do we know they were
acting on Mahanian precepts on some
particular occasion if they did not say
so? Second, Mahan was prone less to
“stark racism” than to the clash-ofcivilizations rhetoric that dominated fin
de siècle Americans’ views of Asia.
Still, these are minor faults in an invaluable work. Will China, like imperial
Japan, succumb to Mahanian determinism? How should America respond?
These are questions worth pondering,
and From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes
a good place to start.
JAMES R. HOLMES

Barrington, Rhode Island
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King, Iain, and Whit Mason. Peace at Any Price:
How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006. 228pp. $27.95

Iraq’s undiminished insurgency has cast
an unmistakable pall over the U.S. military’s nation-building mission, which
until recently seemed a core competency for the Department of Defense.
Both advocates and critics of America’s
efforts to bring peace, order, and good
government to Baghdad agree that the
aftermath of the Balkan wars of the
1990s offers examples of what was not
done in the wake of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM’S epic Phase III success in
spring 2003. The idea that extended
U.S. military operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo have resulted in long-term political successes built on well executed
nation-building is accepted almost
without question. But is it so?
Peace at Any Price poses that difficult
question and provides a richly disturbing series of answers that should be of
interest to anyone concerned with the
ability of Western governments and organizations to bring stability to failed
states, even with overwhelming military
force at their disposal. The authors,
both veterans of UN nation-building in
Kosovo, dissent from received wisdom
in their survey of Kosovo after more
than five years of NATO protection and
UN largesse.
What King and Mason find in that troubled, unstable, and impoverished Balkan
statelet (which is legally part of Serbia
but under international occupation, now
inching painfully toward independence)
is a witches’ brew of nationalism, corruption, and criminality that bodes ill
for the future of Kosovo and surrounding states. The authors begin with a close
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look at the mid-March 2004 mass rioting
that swept through Kosovo, resulting in
hundreds of civilian casualties and largescale destruction of property and, above
all, shattering any hope of reconciliation
between Kosovo’s Albanian majority
and dwindling Serb minority. Five years
after launching Operation ALLIED FORCE
to save the Albanians from the Serbs,
NATO troops had to defend the Serbs
from the Albanians, and not always with
much ardor or success.
King and Mason’s account is balanced
and just, sparing no group, least of all
the UN, the European Union, or NATO,
from fair criticism as to how Kosovo
has been governed since mid-1999. This
is not a history text—it leaves out all
but a limited, necessary understanding
of how Kosovo became so troubled by
the end of the 1990s—but rather a detailed telling of how ineffective Western
political and military institutions have
been at transforming Kosovo into anything resembling a law-abiding or selfsustaining society. The authors spend
considerable time detailing the depths
of interethnic hatreds, from the grand to
the petty, that continue to cripple daily
life in Kosovo, while refusing to spare
Western nongovernmental organizations
from critiques of their naïveté and ineffectiveness in dealing with mutual AlbanianSerb fear and loathing.
Peace at Any Price ends with a helpful
guide on how the international community can do better the next time it is
confronted with a Kosovo. King and
Mason’s counsel is wise and well taken,
ranging from how to improve war termination to ensure a lasting peace, to
how security and the rule of law must
be established before democracy can
take root, and above all to how “bad
habits, “ including local “traditions” of

6
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banditry, criminality, and interethnic
violence must be altered, by force if
necessary, if Western governments and
organizations expect to make failed,
war-torn states into bona fide members
of the international community.
One only wishes that this little gem of a
book had been published earlier.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER

Naval War College

Loveman, Brian, ed. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region.
New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 367pp.
$27.95

It does not take exceptional analytical
talent to recognize that U.S. policies in
the Andean region of South America
face severe challenges, especially those
dealing with the war on drugs. Neither
does it take an exceptional historian to
recognize that the United States has all
too often paid insufficient attention to
its regional neighbors and partners.
Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery
of international relations to recognize
that South America is becoming increasingly important to the safety, wellbeing, and future prosperity of the
United States. For all these reasons, a
clear explanation of U.S. policies in the
region and evaluation of those policies’
track records and potential future consequences are especially welcome.
To a degree, and despite a somewhat
incendiary title, Addicted to Failure provides a portion of the needed understanding. Its editor asked a rather
impressively credentialed group of analysts to examine each of the countries in
the Andean region and the role that
U.S. policy has had in shaping those
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states’ political futures. These analyses
follow Brian Loveman’s own overview
of U.S. policies in the entire region. A
chapter devoted to the European Union’s
efforts follows a state-by-state review,
and the book concludes with an examination of a possible preemptive U.S.
intervention in Colombia on the scale
of operations currently being conducted in Iraq.
However, this volume is not a resounding success. Loveman’s introductory
chapter is a case in point. His basic argument seems to be that U.S. policy,
whether crafted by Republican or Democratic presidents, formed during or after
the Cold War, altruistic or operational
in nature, intentional or accidental, has
been consistently wrong. U.S. policy,
Loveman argues, has for decades made
matters worse for Andean states. There
are two problems here. First, Loveman’s
disdain for past and present U.S. actions
actually begins to obstruct and detract
from his central argument. Readers expecting to find a more academic and
objective analysis may question the objectivity of the author at the expense of
the merit of his argument. The second
problem is even more serious. Loveman
seeks to prove his contention with official U.S. reports and documents, but
the quotations are highly selective and
all too often presented without context.
Indeed, had an equally passionate voice
argued the distaff side of Loveman’s argument, this would have been a most
interesting volume.
Luckily, the next six chapters are different. Authored by well known and respected scholars, they draw a compelling
picture of U.S. policy in the Andean region. Although all are worthy, Orlando
Perez’s evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan
policy and Enrique Obando’s analysis
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of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high
points of the book. Obando does an especially fine job reviewing the successes
and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug
policies.
Addicted to Failure effectively raises several significant issues for the reader to
mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug
policy been a costly failure that has made
the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo
Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier?
Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats
to the United States beyond those associated with drug trafficking? If the current policies are counterproductive,
what are the correct policies? Loveman
does not provide convincing answers to
the first two questions and does not address the third.
At the end of the day, Addicted to Failure is a book that should not be disregarded. It encourages readers to plunge
deeper into the complexities of South
America. For while Loveman and his
authors may not offer any answers, it is
clear that the United States will face increasingly complex challenges from this
part of the world in the years ahead.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Taylor, Lewis. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in
Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997. Liverpool,
U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2006. 232pp. $32.50

In Shining Path Lewis Taylor provides
compelling evidence that the attitude of
the people can be decisive in war. That
point will not surprise students of warfare; they will recall that two great strategists stressed the central importance of
having the people on your side. Focusing
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primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl
von Clausewitz coined the notion that
war’s dominant tendencies make a
“paradoxical trinity,” of which one pole
comprises primordial violence, hatred,
and enmity, a blind natural force. The
passions, Clausewitz wrote, “that are to
be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people.” Concentrating on
guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung famously wrote that “in the relationship
that should exist between the people
and the troops, the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish
that inhabit it.”
In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to
understand and respect the rural population on the parts of the guerrillas (the
Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”)
led by Abimael Guzmán and of the government of Peru came close to dooming
the efforts of both sides in the bloody
conflict. After the end of hostilities, a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
concluded that more than sixty-nine
thousand Peruvians had been killed in
the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the
Shining Path responsible for the majority of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao
made clear that the end of warfare was
not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor
shows how close the combatants came,
through their own excesses, to defeating
their own causes.
Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin
American sociology at the University of
Liverpool, does not adequately highlight the strategic implications of his
subject. In fact, reading his book leaves
unanswered the questions of why he
wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses
his study narrowly on the northern
highlands of Peru, which were a particularly brutal locus of armed action. Although he acknowledges that generalized
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violence occurred in 1992 in twentyone of Peru’s twenty-four departments,
he ignores other important areas of the
conflict. He also writes as though the
war in Peru proceeded without an international context, except for the intellectual contribution of Mao Tse-tung.
True, the Cold War had ended by the
time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán,
but many observers think the agents
could not have succeeded without the
help of outside intelligence. In addition,
U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs
not only disrupted a source of support
to the Shining Path but also relieved
economic pressure on the government
of Peru when it was sorely stressed by
the conflict.
The Peruvian war provides insights for
the future of revolutionary movements
in Latin America—in countries with
elected governments and when no support will be available from a Cuba or a
Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold
War. Fortunately, any reader interested
in those issues, as well as in a systematic
treatment of the strategic lessons of two
decades of conflict in Peru, can find an
excellent source in Cynthia McClintock’s
1998 Revolutionary Movements in Latin
America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s
Shining Path, published by the United
States Institute of Peace Press.
PAUL D. TAYLOR

Naval War College

Matheson, Michael J. Council Unbound: The
Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and
Postconflict Issues after the Cold War. Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006.
422pp. $19.95
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When a longtime Department of State
attorney and former member of the
prestigious International Law Commission takes the time to recount his considerable firsthand observations of the
performance of the United Nations,
Naval War College Review readers do
well to take notice. At a time when a
new U.S. geographic command is being
stood up in Africa and military forces
find their planning and operations centers increasingly visited by coalition,
interagency, international, and nongovernmental organizational representatives, it is indispensable to have a
clear understanding of the evolving role
of the UN Security Council and its
technical commissions and tribunal investigators. Matheson provides us with
an insightful description, one that
nicely serves that purpose.
The book is arranged in seven chapters
and five appendixes. The first chapter
provides a straightforward description
of the UN Charter provisions that serve
as the framework for action by the Security Council. It is complemented by
chapter 2, which describes the council’s
jurisdiction and mandate as the institution charged with the “primary responsibility for maintenance of international
peace and security.” The next three
chapters provide general descriptions of
the three principal modalities of Security Council actions: sanctions, peacekeeping and governance, and use of
force. The growing importance of UN
technical commissions is then described,
followed by an examination of the UN
role in prosecuting international
crimes. The book is well indexed and
includes summaries of some of the key
council resolutions and a bibliography
that will prove useful to those seeking
more detailed coverage.
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Matheson documents most of the recurring concerns in sanctions (problems with enforcement, collateral
consequences, and possible legal limits
on sanctions), peacekeeping operations
(tensions produced by the principles of
consent and impartiality applicable to
Chapter VI peacekeeping operations),
and the use of force. Also provided is a
most welcome description of the various UN technical commissions and of
the criminal tribunals established by the
Security Council to address crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia
and in Rwanda. His descriptions are
concise, accurate, and well documented.
This book admirably serves its descriptive role and supports the author’s thesis regarding the council’s post–Cold
War renaissance. In the end, however,
one comes away feeling that the UN has
been largely spared critical scrutiny in
this book, that the writer, though eminently well qualified to take us through
a more focused and prescriptive treatment of this vital international institution, stopped short. Now that Matheson
has piqued our interest, perhaps he will
provide us with those additional insights in a sequel—one that draws out
the lessons to be learned from the “renascent” Security Council’s response to
the acknowledged threats to international peace and security posed by Iran’s
nuclear programs and the genocide in
Darfur.
CRAIG H. ALLEN

Naval War College

Reveron, Derek S., ed. America’s Viceroys: The
Military and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 214pp. $75

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/10

T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:52 AM

In 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana
Priest wrote a series of articles on the
rising importance of the regional combatant commanders, comparing them
to modern-day “proconsuls” whose
Roman forebears served as regional
governors and commanders in chief of
their military forces. Reveron’s America’s Viceroys examines this comparison,
providing a historical and contemporary analysis of contemporary regional
combatant commanders and their rising influence in the foreign policy–
making arena. (While the implications
of this rising trend are left to the reader,
nowhere does the book imply that our
combatant commanders are presentday Caesars, about to cross the Rubicon
and seize Rome.) The last chapter of
Reveron’s book expertly examines their
rising power and influence on traditional civil-military relations. In short,
he finds, administrations use the military in non-warfighting ways, because
of its size, capabilities, and “can-do”
culture.
It is somewhat ironic that it was the
military services and the Pentagon that
fought hardest to prevent the ascendancy of the regional combatant commanders. Four decades of legislative
changes to the Department of Defense
and military mistakes from World War
II to DESERT ONE finally culminated in
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This
act finally gave unity of command to
the combatant commanders and reduced the service chiefs to the secondary role of training and equipping their
forces. In hindsight, however, it was the
Department of State, not the service
chiefs, who suffered the greatest loss of
influence with this change.
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The regional combatant commanders
today are considered by many within the
U.S. government to be policy entrepreneurs. Each commands a large staff,
oversees a huge budget, and travels frequently within his region to promote
U.S. interests. In fact, our national security strategy now directs regional combatant commanders to engage with
regional allies and promote theater security cooperation. A regional viewpoint
and focus, instead of the country-specific
view represented by U.S. ambassadors,
makes combatant commanders ideally
suited to promote and implement security agreements with heads of state.
Their enormous resources and regional
access dwarf the capabilities of the State
Department, whose process of policy
formulation still resides in Washington,
D.C. In contrast, regional commanders
are out on the ramparts daily, just like
the proconsuls or British viceroys in the
days of empire.
In this aspect, readers will find much of
value in the book. As Reveron points
out, there is a paucity of scholarly research on the subject of foreign policy
making by regional combatant commanders and their subsequent encroachment into traditional fields of
international relations. Anthony Zinni,
a retired Marine Corps general and former commander of U.S. Central Command, describes the book in these
terms: “Derek Reveron has put together
an excellent work describing the controversial role of our nation’s combatant commanders. It is an insightful,
accurate, and provocative presentation
of the issues and history done by
first-rate contributors who clearly know
the subject.” The book is well suited for
midcareer officers and students of
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international relations who are about to
enter the field of national security policy
making. While the cost of the hardcover
edition will certainly deter all but the
most avid readers of foreign policy, the
paperback is now available for $26.95.
DONALD K. HANSEN

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Gillespie, Paul G. Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions. Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 2006. 232pp. $35

At least since medieval expert Lynn
White’s controversial argument that the
stirrup was responsible for the demise
of feudalism, historians have highlighted the seminal role of technology
in social change. Paul Gillespie’s compelling, compact history of precision
guided munitions (PGMs) is unlikely to
raise such an acrimonious debate, but
he has provided a valuable contribution
to the study of technology and society
and, more specifically, to the rapidly
growing body of literature concerning
the “revolution in military affairs.”
The great advantage of Gillespie’s book
is its focus on a single, obviously significant military technology and on that
technology’s effect on national security
policy. The book traces the history of
PGMs from World War I; the grainy
picture of a destroyed bridge on the
dust cover turns out to be, somewhat
surprisingly, not the “Vietnam poster
child” for PGMs (the notorious Tranh
Hoa Bridge) but a bridge destroyed by
an early guided bomb in Burma during
World War II. Some readers may find a
few of Gillespie’s claims a bit too “Air
Force laudatory,” but one should expect
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at least a bit of airpower advocacy from
a professor of history who teaches at the
Air Force Academy. Gillespie’s account
is on the whole balanced and well documented, and his frank discussion of
some of the less-than-favorable impacts
of PGMs on national security policy
makes it clear he is not a complete
airpower zealot.
Nearly as valuable as the technologypolicy linkage is the detailed and intimate look at the technology innovation
process itself. Perhaps the best chapter
is the author’s account of the mid-1960s
development of the Paveway laserguided bomb. Gillespie makes it clear
that this was not the work of an “individual inventive genius” but rather the
product of a host of factors ranging
from changes in national policy (i.e.,
“flexible response”), newly available
supporting technologies (the laser and
integrated circuit), an innovative engineering team from a minor defense
contractor (Texas Instruments), and a
persistent and bureaucratically adept
Air Force colonel.
The biggest disappointment with this
work is that despite its October 2006 release date, the most recent conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq are treated almost
as afterthoughts. There are PGM successes that could be amplified from
these conflicts (e.g., the evolution of
“urban close air support” and even the
demise of the terrorist al-Zarqawi), and
a fuller treatment would reinforce
Gillespie’s central contribution.
Weapons of Choice makes a good case
that PGMs have indeed altered the
American approach to war as “policymakers have seized upon precision
guided munitions as the key to more
humane war.” Gillespie makes clear this
is not a wholly positive development,
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because “an anemic, casualty-averse
policy is unlikely to deter or defeat the
determined, resourceful foe,” and perhaps more importantly, because “winning and maintaining the peace” has
proven much more difficult than destroying targets. While he could have
made his argument even stronger, Paul
Gillespie makes clear (with apologies to
Abraham Maslow) that the mere presence of an elegant hammer could cause
policy makers to overlook all but the
nails. Iraq and Afghanistan may further
reinforce Paul Gillespie’s assertion that
“technology best serves those who
thoughtfully implement it.”
DAVID BUCKWALTER

Naval War College

Burrows, William E. The Survival Imperative:
Using Space to Protect the Earth. New York: Forge
Books, 2006. 306pp. $24.95

Nowadays we take for granted that
space assets are necessary for military
operations, but the nonmilitary use of
space has also passed into the realm of
the necessary. While the use of space assets, and thus access to space, is of vital
importance to the nation, there is no
watershed work that unites the political, economic, industrial, and military
aspects into a single vision. Space policy, in other words, is still waiting for
its Mahan.
If he is not quite Mahan, veteran space
writer William E. Burrows lays a very
good foundation for what could evolve
into a national (or even international)
policy—planetary protection. The author unites two major themes under this
concept: protecting the earth from asteroid or comet strikes and monitoring the
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global environment to ward off an ecological disaster.

critical insights on the political drivers
for the space program.

Burrows provides an excellent summary
of asteroid strikes, from the dinosaur
killer to the 1908 Tunguska impact. But
is he overstating the threat? Imagine
Katrina on a global scale, or a nuclear
power mistaking an asteroid for a nuclear attack and retaliating. A large
enough strike could devastate the planet,
and, without warning, we could do
nothing to prevent it.

Is Burrows’s premise farfetched? The 5
December 2006 edition of the Washington Times quoted the December issue of
Popular Mechanics that on Friday, 13
April 2029, a twenty-five-million-ton
asteroid will pass the earth less than
twenty-one thousand miles away. At
least, scientists claimed there was a 99.7
percent chance the asteroid will miss.

Burrows, who also wrote Deep Black
(1988), argues that overhead reconnaissance systems represent the perfect tool
for monitoring the global environment.
He asserts that these types of assets can
provide early warning of ecological devastation (such as deforestation and
overfishing), enabling more effective
protection of the environment.
Burrows makes a number of recommendations. He argues for expanded
and continued support for ongoing efforts to monitor “near earth objects”
and supports a U.S. interagency effort
for monitoring the global environment.
In the long term, he believes, establishing a human presence in space will be
necessary. Unlike other visionaries
(such as Gerard K. O’Neill and G.
Harry Stine), Burrows declares that
permanent human presence in space
will follow an economic need, rather
than the other way round. His wedge
into space is building a data warehouse
on the moon to preserve humanity’s
cultural and technological heritage. On
the moon its contents would be accessible to anyone on earth who could rig a
relatively simple communications site.
The author also provides a superb political and social history of the space program, up to the present, and provides
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JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Va.

Klein, John J. Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles
and Policy. Space Power and Politics Series. New
York: Routledge, 2006. 196pp. $110

We are a nation inextricably linked to
space. Every instrument of our national
power—diplomatic, information, military, economic—relies to some degree
on access to and unimpeded use of
space. Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy uses this fact to illustrate
its author’s point that despite an increasing reliance on space capabilities,
the United States has yet to develop a
comprehensive space-power theory.
Klein has written extensively on spacepower theory, and this book builds
upon many of his previous works, addressing the need for a national space
strategy that adequately links space operations with national interests.
Throughout Space Warfare Klein astutely draws numerous parallels with
space as a medium of national power
similar to those of air, land, and the sea
as viewed and utilized by independent
states. As space capabilities increase in
importance in relation to national
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power and security around the world,
Klein reasons, space will become an
arena where states will protect their
space assets in the same manner that
they protect their sovereign airspace,
land, and territorial seas. To this end,
he draws upon the historical context of
Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy
theory as a basis on which to build a
comprehensive space strategy. Previous
attempts at space strategies have hinged
upon using air or naval strategies, or a
combination of the two. Klein argues
that simply using air or naval strategies
is too restrictive and does not adequately capture the uniqueness of space
operations. Air and naval strategies in
his view are too militarily focused, specifically on offensive weapons, or lack
the proper linkage to the instruments of
national power. For these reasons he
turns to Corbett’s maritime theory,
which describes the relationship between land and sea as vital and also
serves well as a model for development
of space strategy.
This unique approach may be criticized
by some. However, these same critics
would do well to understand Klein’s use
of Corbett not as the be-all and end-all
approach to space strategy but rather as
a framework upon which to build. In
fact, Klein himself admits that his approach to a space strategy largely agrees
with current joint doctrine, the Space
Commission Report, and other publications. However, his treatment highlights
some areas deserving more debate, such
as a better understanding of the defense
of high-value positions in space and access to what he calls “celestial lines of
communication,” a phrase adapted
from classic Corbett.
Klein’s Corbett-based space strategy is
presented in a fairly easy-to-read way,
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although some of his basic premises
are quite repetitive. Additionally, a
few of his recommendations may be
viewed as incredibly challenging, if not
impossible, from technological and fiscal perspectives.
This is a must-read for military and
nonmilitary strategic thinkers with interests or stakes in space operations.
While it is sure to raise some eyebrows,
particularly in the air and space communities, this book does what it is supposed to do: raise the level of debate on
the formulation of a sound space strategy. This is a critically important subject,
one that if not properly implemented
and understood could have disastrous
consequences on our national interests.
DANA E. STRUCKMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Naval War College

Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda
and the Road to 9/11. New York: Knopf, 2006.
480pp. $27.95

Lawrence Wright has provided the military professional an excellent primer
into the world of those who see the
United States as a threat. The Arab
world remains little understood by
most Americans. It takes Wright nearly
five hundred pages to lay out the complex tale of modern Islamic fundamentalism. It is no surprise that Osama Bin
Laden is a key player, and Wright gives
him center stage. Bin Laden is the son
of a wealthy Yemeni who through grit
and hard work earned the favor of the
ruling family in Saudi Arabia for boldness in civil engineering projects that
helped Saudi Arabia advance into the
twentieth century.
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The 1980s saw the first true conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and a
major power, the ten-year war waged
by the mujahideen in Afghanistan after
the Soviet invasion. The Soviet Union
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989,
having suffered an unexpected drubbing. Emboldened by their victory
against one superpower, many mujahideen, under the spiritual leadership of
Osama Bin Laden (who spent some time
in Afghanistan during the war), turned
to fighting the new threat to Islam posed
by the United States. The organization
formed from disparate jihadist groups in
Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan to meet this
task was one whose name would become
synonymous with the most violent form
of anti-American Islamic fundamentalism—al-Qa‘ida (the Base). Ironically, it
was the United States that, through the
CIA, had largely financed and equipped
the mujahideen and other anti-Soviet
forces in Afghanistan.
The Looming Tower is truly a book for
our time. The New York Times agrees; it
selected it as one of the ten best books
of 2006. Drawing upon expertise gained
from living and teaching in the Middle
East, Wright has written a succinct and
engaging work on the history, religion,
and temperament of a people who remain at best enigmatic to most Americans. More importantly, Wright’s
narrative characterizes the path to September 11th as a lengthy and convoluted
one, a journey that started long ago. The
attacks on that day were the next step in
an irrevocable conflict between elements
of radical Islam and the country they saw
as a threat to their existence.
The lessons of The Looming Tower are
many. The United States can succeed in
its fight against the radicals of Islam
only if it is completely united, with all
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internal barriers swept aside. Much has
been done in the years since that clear,
blue Tuesday morning in September to
reconcile that environment. The other
take-away is that Bin Laden and his ilk
are more complex than their rhetoric
would have us believe. His followers,
however, see him as a devout Muslim,
pure in thought and strident in deed,
out to defend his faith from foreign influences bent on its destruction. So as
long as the United States remains engaged in that vital region, his likes will
remain ever present and ever the threat.
DAVID L. TESKA

Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

Key, Joshua, and Lawrence Hill. The Deserter’s
Tale: The Story of an Ordinary Soldier Who
Walked Away from the War in Iraq. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2007. 237pp. $23

Joshua Key is a young married man
with four children who joined the U.S.
Army to escape the grinding poverty of
his life in Guthrie, Oklahoma. In 2003,
he was deployed to Iraq with the 43rd
Combat Engineer Company. At the end
of seven months, Key had become so
disillusioned with the Army and the Iraq
war that he deserted while on leave in
the United States. He ultimately made
his way to Canada to ask for asylum.
Lawrence Hill, a Canadian writer and
journalist, put Key’s story into coherent
form.
Although the book is well written, it is
actually hard to read, because of the
U.S. Army’s allegations of Key’s disloyalty, dishonesty, disrespect, selfishness,
dishonor, lack of integrity, and cowardice, particularly during his first deployment with the 3rd Armored Cavalry
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Regiment to Iraq. Also, like others who
have served for many years in the military, I find it tough to read about the
wrong-headed thinking and excuses of
a deserter.
Yet this is a book that we must read, if
for no other reason than not to allow
Private Key’s allegations to go unanswered. Consider, for example, that this
book sells in Costco’s and is listed as
one of its best sellers.
Is Joshua Key a weak man who was
pressured by his wife to desert, exaggerating or lying outright about his experience in Iraq to justify his desertion and
gain sympathy from the Canadian authorities? Or is Private Key a naive,
trusting, moral man who could no longer stomach participation in a constant
series of immoral, unethical, and sometimes illegal acts in Iraq? These are the
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questions that many may ask themselves when reading this book. Further,
as a result of this work these troublesome allegations now reside in the public domain. The Army should determine
the truth. The outcome will determine
if the allegations are to be refuted or if
serious soul-searching and significant
changes in Army culture, training, and
leadership must be pursued.
The Deserter’s Tale does a credible job
explaining Joshua Key’s action, and it
provides some serious food for thought
about how the United States has been
selecting, training, and leading its soldiers. However, unfortunately, the book
fails to provide a good reason for Private Key’s act of desertion.
THOMAS MOORE

Monterey, California
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